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This thesis is a case study of the Georgia General Assembly. The impetus for the
study is to provide black legislators with information to aid them to increase African
American legislative representation. This is accomplished by reviewing legislators’
voting records for the period 1996 to 1998. Statistical and spatial analysis techniques
were used to determine if district black population percentage (BPP) and population
density affect the way different legislator cohort groups vote on issues that impact black
quality of life in Georgia.
These analyses provide the following three conclusions: 1) there is a linear
functional relationship between BPP and white lawmaker support for legislation
considered beneficial to black interests; 2) there is no discemable difference between
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rural and urban white legislators’ support for black interest; and 3) black legislators are
supportive ofblack interests at all levels ofBPP.
Recommendations provided to increase black legislative representation include;
1) reapportion black populations from districts with over 50 percent BPP to others that
have 10 to 40 percent BPP in order to increase the number of majority black districts; 2)
increase the number of black influence districts; and 3) The Georgia Legislative Black
Caucus (GLBC) should conduct strategic redistricting planning.
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African Americans in the United States have been denied their constitutional right to
political representation for most of their history. In fact, a black did not hold elective
office until 1854 when John Langston was sworn in as clerk of Brownhelm Township,
Ohio. Prior to the Civil War, black men could vote only in six northern states. During
Reconstruction, blacks in the southern United States were afforded short-lived
representation in local, state and national political office but were later excluded until the
mid-1960s.
Even after overt institutional barriers to black voting were dismantled in the
1940s and 1950s, other noninstitutional tactics were used to suppress black political
representation. To end these tactics, the Voting Rights Act (VRA) was enacted in
1965, which abolished literacy tests, permitted the use of federal marshals as election
observers and mandated the prior review of changes in local electoral policies to
’Charles M. Christian, Black Saga: The African American Experience (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1995), 13.
^Bernard Grofman, Minority Representation and the Quest for Voting Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press 1992), 4.
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determine if they abridge “minority voting rights.”^ Many states were forced by the
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to create majority-minority districts to increase
minority representation. During the 1992 and 1994 elections, the number of black
legislators in state houses and in the U. S. Congress increased dramatically.
Historically, the DOJ and civil rights organizations, such as the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), have sought to increase
the number of black and minority districts in state legislatures and Congress to promote
equal representation. A group of scholars believe that the creation of these districts had
counter-productive outcomes and was responsible for the “Republican Revolution” in
1994 when the GOP gained control of the U. S. House of Representatives and majority
status in several state legislatures. For example, Princeton University’s Carol Swain
believes that the creation of majority-minority districts promotes the concentration of
conservatives and Republicans in districts that are almost devoid of liberals and
minorities. As a result. Republicans have gained control of Congress and reduced the
number of white liberal and black committee chairs. Furthermore, they believe African
American lawmakers have become “a minority in the minority party.” Several of these
say black interests are better served by influence districts where minorities are 30 to 50
percent of the districts’ population, asserting that black interest are best achieved by
seeking substantive as opposed to descriptive representation. Substantive representation
^Bernard Grofman, Collaborative Research on the Voting Rights Act: Implementation, Effects, and
Implicationsfor Law and Society, National Science Foundation Grant Proposal, 4 January 1988.
is the meeting of constituent interests, while descriptive refers to the representation of a
political district by an elected official who is of the same race as the majority of the
district’s constituency.
Adding to the debate is the belief that influence districts are not achievable in
the southern United States because of the region’s legacy of racism, i.e., rural white
legislators, even with large black constituencies, do not support black interests because
of racism.
Because blacks historically have been underrepresented in the Georgia General
Assembly, there has been considerable debate among political scientists, legislators,
and social justice advocates regarding the best methods to represent black interests.
Supporting Carol Swain’s view, “The Rating the Legislators” chapter of the Georgia
Legislative Review (GLR) 1997 showed that white legislators with large black
constituencies (WLLBCs) greater than 40 percent outperformed their black counterparts
on votes that affect blacks and the poor.'* However, the opposite phenomenon was
chronicled in the 1998 edition, when black legislators outperformed WLLBCs. Also,
voting data from 1998 show that urban WLLBCs are more supportive of black and poor
Georgian’s political agendas than mral WLLBCs.^
“'Goro Mitchell and Shelly Broomes, “Rating the Legislators,” in Georgia Legislative Review 1997, ed. Bob
Holmes (Atlanta: Southern Center for Studies in Public Policy, 1997), 83.
*Goro Mitchell, “Rating the Legislators,” in Georgia Legislative Review 1998, ed. Bob Holmes (Atlanta; The
Southern Center for Studies in Public Policy, 1998), 127.
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Consequently, there exists a problem in determining the best Georgia General
Assembly redistricting schemes to lobby for in 2001 to maximize the meeting of black
substantive interests, i. e., support more majority-black districts or more black influence
districts? This research will determine at what levels of black constituency do white
legislators support black interests. In addition, the thesis will examine racial polarization
in rural and urban districts and whether influence districts are viable in these areas.
Hypotheses
Hi White legislators in rural areas are less responsive to black political interests than
white urban legislators with similar Black Percentage Populations (BPPs).
H2 White urban legislators with district BPP of 30-50 percent have voting records on
legislation affecting blacks comparable to those ofGLBC members with similar BPPs.
H3 There is a linear functional relationship between BPP and white legislator support for
legislation that positively impacts black quality of life.
H4 Black political agendas are best served by majority-black districts.
Theoretical Frameworks
There are three theories of black interests and representation that will be assessed
and operationalized in this thesis.
Theories ofBlackPolitical Interests Identification
Carol Swain provides one with a framework for the identification of black
interests. She separates the identification process into two theories of black interest, 1)
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objective, and 2) subjective.^ Objective interests are identified from observable
phenomena such as a racial group’s disproportional prison population levels and poverty
rates. Subjective interests pertain to the views, opinions and beliefs shared by a group,
which can be found in polls. In other words, if a large percentage of African Americans
are concerned about environmental justice then it is a subjective interest.
Clark Atlanta University Professor Bob Holmes asserts that black interests are
those put forth by black civil rights organizations such as the NAACP and state and
national black caucuses. As such. Holmes and Swain’s methods of black interest
identification will be combined in this study to identify black interests.
Theories ofBlackPolitical Representation
There are two types of black representation, descriptive and substantive.
According to Hannah Pitkin, descriptive representation, is the “statistical correspondence
of the demographic characteristics of representatives with those of their constituents.”^
Pitkin’s theory of substantive representation posits a connection between elite
representatives’ goals and those of their constituents.* Similarly, Charles Cameron and
*Carol Swain, Black Faces, Black Interest: The Representation ofAfrican American in Congreii (Cambridge:




others believe that the true measure of representation is the support for substantive public
policy that improves the position ofblacks.^
The third theory of black representation relates to the percent of black population
in determining black influence. During the 1990s, the number of minorities holding
office, what Lani Guinier calls the “theory of black electoral success” was used to
measure the advancement of black interests. This theory assumes that substantive and
descriptive black interests are one in the same. My research will attempt to ascertain
which of these competing theories is valid in the Georgia Legislature.
Effect ofBlack Constituency Population on Legislators’ Support for Black Interests
There are two theories ofminority representation and district Black Voting Age
Population (VAP): 1) majoritarianism, which assumes that black voters in a district will
have little influence on an elected officials’ behavior until they constitute a majority; and
2) influence district, which refers to the positive relationship between the percentage of
blacks and the representation of black interests where they represent 30-50 percent.
Supporting the first view, William Keech asserts that white representatives do not take
much notice of blacks unless their numbers rise to 25 to 30 percent at which, the
polarization effect takes over and representation of minority interests will decline in the
’Charles Cameron, David Epstein and Sharyn Halloran, “Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize
Substantive Black Representation in Congress?” American Political Science Review (December 1996): 796.
'“Lani Guinier, “Don’t Scapegoat the Gerrymanderer,” New York Times Magazine, 8 January 1995, 36.
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south until blacks comprise a majority of the VAP." A departure from Keech’s theory is
termed “threshold affect,” which is described separately by Epstein and O’Halloran
(1995) and McCain and Stewart (1995). According to this theory there is a threshold of
racial and ethnic minority population necessary to have these groups represented
(influence districts).’^ It is assumed that white legislators become more responsive to
their black constituency as the black population percentage increases in urban districts. It
is further assumed that rural district legislators will be less responsive than their urban
counterparts when this occurs.
Research Questions
This research attempts to answer the following questions:
1. Are black interests in Georgia better served by a legislative district system that
maximizes majority-black districts or black influence districts?
2. What effect does Black constituency percentage levels have on the way white
legislators vote on issues that directly affect African Americans?
3. How do the voting records of black legislators and white legislators who represent
black influence districts compare on bills that directly affect black quality of life in
Georgia?
' 'william Keech, The Impact ofNegro Voting; the Role of the Vote in the Questfor Equality (Chicago: Rand
McNally. 1968), 100.
'^Charles Cameron, David Epstein and Sharyn Halloran, “Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize
Substantive Black Representation in Congress?” 795.
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4. Are there major differences in the voting behavior of urban and rural white legislators
on issues that affect black Georgians?
Study Rationale
With the 2000 census quickly approaching and the subsequent redrawing of new
state legislative districts in 2001, it is very timely to assess how well different legislator
cohort groups represent their black constituents’ interests. There is little research
available on how these cohort groups in the Georgia General Assembly vote on issues
that affect black Georgians. This thesis will also prescribe electoral options which might
best facilitate substantive black political representation in the Georgia Legislature.
Methodology
The case study approach was used to analyze the voting habits of Georgia
legislators on issues impacting black Georgians between 1996 and 1998, and included
five components: 1) identification of House and Senate votes over the period 1996 to
1998 that impact black interests positively or negatively; 2) assignment of a numerical
“score” for each legislative district based on voting records; 3) assessment of the
functional relationship between district black population percentage (BPP) and voting
scores; 4) assessment of the functional relationship between district population density




To quantify legislators’ support of black interests in the Georgia legislature, a
score was calculated reflective of their voting records on key bills that affect blacks.
This was accomplished by identifying and analyzing 18 votes (6 per legislator per year)
for each house from 1996 to 1998. The legislation used and the “correct vote” was
identified by the author and issues and positions identified by the Georgia Legislative
Black Caucus (GLBC) and civil rights organizations. Legislators were assigned a
numeric score with 100 being the highest and 0 the lowest. Each legislator was
awarded 5.56 points for a correct vote and no points for not voting or casting a vote
that is deemed not favorable to blacks.
These scores were correlated with each of the key independent variables—black
population percentages (BPPs) in each district and population density. BPP is used
instead of black voting age population (BVAP) because BPP is the variable employed in
the Georgia State redistricting process. A Pearson statistical test was performed to
determine the strength of correlation between the two variables. To determine
population density’s effect on scores, i.e., whether rural legislators’ average scores
differ significantly between urban and rural legislators, a Geographic Information
System (GIS) was used to identify districts with populations greater and less than 2,500
persons per square mile (see definition of rural and urban in Definition of Key Terms
section). Average scores for these two sets of legislators were compared. GIS maps
were used to illustrate findings.
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The final analysis compares scores of white legislators representing districts with
BPP of 30 to 50 percent with those of black legislators to determine which group
provides the most substantive representation of black interests. This was accomplished
by employing contingency tables, which compare average white and black legislators’
scores by BPP.
Thesis Organization
The thesis contains four chapters and a bibliography:
Chapter One - Introduction.
Chapter Two - Identification of analysis votes, assignment of correct votes and
summaries of the legislation.
Chapter Three - Analysis of research findings.
Chapter Four - Implications of research findings and recommendations.
Bibliography
Definition ofTerms
Black Political Interests - Issues that impact the quality of life of African Americans
living in Georgia. Black interests pertain to issues that disproportionately impact
African Americans. They can be identified by polls and surveys, and by black civic
and social justice organizations as well as the Georgia Legislative Black Caucus.
Descriptive Representation - Representation in a legislative body that approximates the
proportion ofblacks or otherminority groups in the population.
Dependent Variable - The effect or consequence of an independent variable.
Elective Democracy - Allows for all eligible voters to cast an equally weighted vote
which permits most groups of voters to be represented or elected/^
Gerrymandering - The use of biased redistricting to achieve disproportionate political
representation of certain groups in an elected decision-making body.
Independent Variable - The cause or antecedent of a dependent variable.
Majority-Black District - An elective district in which the majority of the population is
African American.
Majority-Majority District - An elective district with a majority-white population.
Minority - Refers to racial and ethnic groups whose populations are less than whites in
the United States, i.e., all nonwhite persons.
Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficient r - A measure of linear dependence
between two variables on an interval or ratio scale. The dimensionless index ranges from
-1.0 to 1.0 (1.0 is a perfect relationship). It reflects the extent of a linear relationship
between two data sets.
Racial Gerrymandering - The drawing of electoral districts to increase the representation
and influence of a racial or ethnic group.
Reapportionment - The process by which congressional districts are drawn in order to
reflect population changes after the decennial census.
Redistricting - The process by which state legislative districts are drawn in order to
reflect population changes after the decennial census.
Rural Legislator - A legislator from a sparsely populated district where the average
population density is less than 2,500 persons per square mile (U. S. Census Bureau
definition).
Substantive Representation - Refers to the achievement of the political interests of a
particular population group.
'^Joseph F. Zimmerman, “Alternative Voting Systems for Representative Democracy,” PS: Political Science
and Politics (December 1994): 674.
'“'Mark E. Rush, “Gerrymandering: Out of the Political Thicket and into the Quagmire,” PS: Political Science
and Politics (December 1994): 682-85.
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Urban Legislator - A legislator from a district where the population density per square
mile averages more than 2,500 (U. S. Census Bureau definition).
Literature Review
Efforts to promote African American electoral participation in the South have
evolved from seeking equal access to the ballot box to contemporary activities to
maximize the number of black political office holders especially in the U. S. Congress
and state legislatures.
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) has had an immense impact on the ability
ofblacks and other minorities to be elected to political office. Professor Bernard Grofman
of the University of California, Irvine argues that Sections 5 (pre-clearance of standard,
practice or procedure) and Section 2 (prohibits voting qualifications or prerequisites to
voting) of the VRA played the most significant role in the increasing black and Hispanic
representation in state legislatxires and Congress because they give the DOJ the ability to
take direct administrative action on behalf of disfranchised minorities.'^ In response to
the interpretation of the 1982 VRA amendments (minorities should not be impeded from
electing the candidate of choice) set forth in Thornburg v. Gingles (1986), the DOJ began
to aggressively support the drawing ofmore majority-black Congressional districts.'^ By
'^Dianne M. Pinderhughes, “Voting Rights Policy and Redistricting: An Introductory Essay,” The National
Political Science Review Volume 6 (1997): 5.
'^Bernard Grofman, “The 1990 Round of Redistricting: a Schematic Outline of Some Key Features,”
National Political Science Review Volume 6 (1997): 17 and Bernard Grofman, Minority Representation and the Quest
for Voting Equality, 16.
'^Richard H. Pildes, review of Quiet Revolution in the South, by eds. Chandler Davidson and Bernard
Grofman, Harvard Law Review (September 1995): 1359
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1992 black voter registration in the south was 66.7 percent or only 1.2 percent below
voter percentages outside the south, 67.9 percent.'* As a result, in 1992 13 blacks and 5
Hispanics were elected in 18 new democratic congressional districts.'^ During the 1994
elections, Democrats lost 52 seats and Republicans won a 12-vote majority in the U.S.
House of Representatives. Nonetheless, according to the Joint Center for Political and
Economic Studies (JCPES), the number of black elected officials increased from less
than 100 in the south before the enactment ofVRA in 1965 to over 8,658 in 1997.^°
Debate—Majority-Minority or Influence District
According to Professor Carol Swain’s article, “The Future of Black
Representation,” the evidence shows that race conscious redistricting cost the Democrats
enough seats to shift the balance of power in the House. Also, Swain points out that
many local and state level white Democrats lost seats because many minority voters
failed to turnout in these districts, believing that the congressional races were no contest.
The Republican majority House represents black interests less than the Democratic one,
although the new Congress now has more black members. According to Swain, minority
leaders have misled voters into confusing more black faces in Congress with greater
'*Ibid.
'’Carol M. Swain, “The Future of Black Representation,” The American Prospect (Fall 1995): 79 Available:
httD://eDn.org/Drospect/23/23swai.html 13 September 1995.
^®Based on United States Department of Commerce, Census Bureau, 1993 Table 2, cited in Richard L.
Engstrom and Jason F. Kirksey, “Race and Representational Districting in Louisiana,” in Race and Redistricting in the
1990s, 286 and David A. Bositis, “Making Votes Count in November,” Focus (September 1998), 4.
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power and influence, but the two are not the same, i.e., the support of black political
'y 1
interests is the true measure of representation.
John J. Miller wrote in an article titled “Race to Defeat: How the Black Caucus
Elected Newt Gingrich Speaker,” that racial gerrymandering had other less beneficial
effects on black political agendas. Miller believes the 1994 redistricting process outcome
doomed seven Democrats to election defeat. Miller cites the conclusion of David Bositis
of the JCPES who believes that racial apportionment may have been responsible for the
loss of as many of 15 democratic seats during the 1992 and 1994 elections. Miller
concludes that the creation of the 13 new black districts concentrated white voters and
thus created more conservative districts.
Another study by political scientists L. Marvin Overby and Kenneth Cosgrove
found a change in voting patterns of representatives that had a decrease in minority
constituencies after redistricting. Specifically, they found that congresspersons became
more conservative and less supportive of policies that were beneficial to Afiican
Americans.^^
Charles Cameron, David Epstein and Sharyn Halloran conclude that majority-
minority districts may impede minority-sponsored legislation by diluting minority
^'Carol M. Swain, “The Future of Black Representation,” 81.
^^John J. Miller, “Race to Defeat; How the Black Caucus Elected Newt Gingrich Speaker,” Reason (February
1995): 23.
^^Carol M. Swain, “The Future of Black Representation,” 80.
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influence in surrounding areas.^"^ On the other hand, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund
(LDF) conducted an analysis of the loss of the 52 democratic seats. The analysis showed
that Republicans captured 24 seats in states where there were no nonwhite majority
districts and 15 seats in white-majority districts surrounded by other white majority
districts. Of the remaining 15 districts, 8 gained minority voters and 6 remained the
same.^^ The LDF found that race conscious redistricting actually saved Democrats in the
south (Georgia and Mississippi) and that the real culprit for the Democratic losses in
Congress was the fact that a majority ofwhite voters shifted to the Republican Party.
Swain disputes some of the findings of the LDF report, stating that in Georgia, the
addition of two majority black districts aided in the loss of twelve-term democrat Richard
Ray, the retirement of three other democrats and the lowering of the number of black
voters in Newt Gingrich’s district from 12 percent to 6 percent which aided in his 974
vote margin of victory in 1992.^^
In 1993, Swain took a different approach to determine the best road to achieve
maximum black political representation. Swain interviewed all of the black members of
the House of Representatives as well as white members with large black constituencies.
She concluded that majority-minority districts only had limited possibilities and that
^‘'Charles Cameron, David Epstein and Sharyn Halloran, “Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize
Substantive Black Representation in Congress,” 794.
^^Carol M. Swain, “The Future of Black Representation,” 80.
^*lbid.
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multi-racial districts offer the greatest opportunity for advancing minority political
interests.^^ She opines that the concentration of minorities into these districts,
“...[reduces] the number of liberal white elected representatives outside their districts
that can be counted upon to support their legislative agendas.
In a Journal of Politics Article titled “Does the Creation of Majority Black
Districts Aid Republicans? An analysis of the 1992 Congressional Elections in Eight
Southern States, ” by Kevin A. Hill of Florida International University, the author asserts,
that based on a statistical analysis of the 1992 elections, “there is a definitive link
between the rising fortunes of Afiican American and Republican representative in the
1992 elections.” Further he states that, “the zeal with which the Justice Department
enforced sections 2 and 5 of the VRA tipped the balance in the south, putting an end to
the practice of spreading black voters around to create a virtually guaranteed pool for
white Democrats.” On the other hand. Hill also posits that half of the democratic districts
lost to Republicans were not the result of racial redistricting.
Swain asserts that race based districting was implemented with the support of an
alliance of voting-rights activists, minority-group leaders and Republicans. Swain says
that this decreased the political influence of blaeks and minorities in Congress by making
^’Carol Swain, Black Faces, Black Interest: The Representation of African Americans in Congress
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1993): 18.
^*Carol Swain, “Race and Representation: A Commentary,” The National Political Science Review, Volume
6(1997): 137.
^^Kevin A. Hill, “Does the Creation ofMajority Black Districts Aid Republicans? An Analysis of the 1992
Congressional Elections in Eight Southern States,” The Journal ofPolitics (May 1995): 399.
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them a minority within a minority, robbed them of three chairmanships of full
committees and 17 chairmanships of subcommittees as well as other leadership positions
within the Democratic Party.
In agreement, Lani Guinier stated in her New York Times Magazine article,
“Don’t Scapegoat the Gerrymanderer,” that the Justice Department’s support for racial
gerrymandering was orchestrated and driven by an unholy alliance between Justice
Department officials and Republicans.^' Other pundits believe that civil rights
organizations were also in collusion with Republicans to draw these districts. These
organizations believed that the Congressional Black Caucus would be more effective
with more members.^^ In support of this theory, Bernard Grofinan states that, “One of
the puzzles of voting rights enforcement is why the DOJ, under Republican presidents,
has pursued a generally tough enforcement policy in the area of voting rights while
regressing or retrenching in all other civil rights domains.’’^^
Relationship between District BPP and White Elected Officials Support ofBlack Interests in
the South
Numerous studies have analyzed the effect BPP has on elected officials voting
behavior in the Southern United States. In 1949, V.O Key Jr. in his seminal study.
^“Carol Swain, “Race and Representation: A Commentary,” 137.
^'Lani Guinier, “Don’t Scapegoat the Gerrymanderer,” 36.
^^John J. Miller, “Race to Defeat,” 24.
^^Bemard Grofman, “The 1990 Round ofRedistricting,” 18.
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Southern Politics in State and Nation, is credited as the first to suggest that white elected
representatives were less responsive to black interest as BPP increased.^"^ William Keech
found that in Tuskeegee, Alabama substantive improvement of services in black
communities, even though blacks made up at least a third of the population, for many
years did not occur until they were the majority of the electorate.^^ According to David
R. Mathews and James W. Prothro, this phenomenon is rooted in the fact that ‘as the
proportion of Negroes in southern communities increases so do the racial anxieties and
fears of southern whites.’ Based on his case studies of Durham North Carolina and
Tuskeegee, Alabama, Keech asserts that as the number of blacks increases in a
community, racial hysteria and anxiety causes elected representatives to be less
responsive to blacks interests. Keech suggests that Durham blacks who were 30 percent
of that city’s population were able to gamer more public services than Tuskeegee, blacks
who had a 45 percent BPP. Keech, in turn, concludes that the white elected decision-
makers become less responsive at a 30 percent black threshold. According to a 1978
study by Merle Black, which analyzed southern Congresspersons’ support for voting
rights legislation, the polarization effect was still evident in 1975. Consistent with
’“*566 V. O. Key Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Random House, 1949), 45.
^^William R. Keech, The Impact ofNegro Voting: the Role of the Vote in the Quest for Equality (Chicago:
Rand McNally and Company, 1968), 94.
^‘Donald R. Mathews and James Prothro, Negroes and the New Southern Politics (New York: Harcourt,




Keech’s Curvilinear Hypothesis, Congresspersons from districts with 20 to 29 percent
•50
BPP had an 88.9 percent support rate and those with higher BPPs were less supportive.
A 1994 study by Michael Combs, Hibbing and Susan Welch found that the polarization
effect was prevalent in the rural south and that the influence district was predominant in
urban areas in the south and the north. Similarly, Kenny Whitby (1985 and 1987) came
to similar conclusions regarding urban and rural representatives’ voting habits.^^
Conversely, in 1994, Lublin, found that a linear relationship between black district
population and voting behavior, maintaining that there is a structural break at 40
i 40
percent.
Cameron, in a review of the voting records of white Congresspersons from the
south, found that in white represented districts with 35-50 percent black constituencies,
responsiveness to the black political agenda is greatly improved over those with less than
25 percent black districts.'*’ David Lublin in review of Congressional voting records
opines that there is a 40 percent black threshold that “raises the responsiveness of
representatives in both white and black majority districts.” He determined that for blacks
to achieve optimum substantive representation, southern districts should be 47 percent
^*Merle Black, “Racial Composition of Congressional Districts and Support for Federal Voting Rights in the
American South,” Social Science Quarterly 435-450.
^’Charles Cameron, David Epstein and Sharyn Halloran, “Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize




black with the remaining black voters distributed across districts as evenly as possible.
Interestingly, in the North, he suggests, representatives to be more responsive to black
interests and recommended that black voters be distributed evenly across districts to
achieve an optimum amount ofblack substantive representation.'*^
Black Representation in the Georgia General Assembly
The presence of blacks in the Georgia Legislature can be dated to 1868 when 33
were elected to the Georgia Assembly. However, by 1907, black representation had been
reduced to zero. It was not until 1962, three years before the passage of the VRA that an
African American, Attorney Leroy Johnson was elected to the Georgia Legislative
Assembly.'*^
The 22 member Georgia Legislative Black Caucus (GLBC) was formally organized
in 1975. Representative Ben Brown of Atlanta was elected its first chair. It hired its first
full time staff in 1983. The number of Afiican Americans in the Georgia General
Assembly increased from 35 in 1992 to 40 in 1993 (31 in the House and 9 in the Senate).
The number of committee chairs and vice chairmanships held by Caucus members also
increased in 1992 to four in the House, five in the Senate, and three vice-chair positions
in both chambers. During the 1993 session, members occupied six chairs in each house
as well as seven vice chairs in the House and five in the Senate. In 1995 the GLBC held
“'^David Lublin, The Paradox ofRepresentation: Racial Gerrymandering and Minority Interests in Congress
(Princeton; Princeton University Press 1997), 3.
^^William H. Boone, “Black Caucus,” in Georgia Legislative Review 1992, eds. Bob Holmes and Gretchen
Maclachlan (Atlanta: The Southern Center for Studies in Public Policy, 1993), 83.
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11 committee chairs, seven in the House and four in the Senate. Of 35 Democratic seats in
the Senate, blacks held 10. Since 29 constituted a constitutional majority, this gave the
Caucus member significant influence.'*'* As a result, in 1997, Charles Walker of Columbus
became the first blackmajority leader of the Senate.'*^
Voting Behavior ofWhite Legislators with Large Black Constituencies in the Georgia
Legislature
The Georgia Legislative Review annually reviews the voting records of Georgia
legislators on issues that directly affect minorities and the poor. Since 1995, the Review
has found that white Georgia legislators with large black constituencies (WLLBCs)
greater than 40 percent have consistently out-performed the Georgia legislature as a
whole. On the other hand, during the 1995 and 1996 sessions these legislators had lower
scores than GLBC members.'*^ A radical change took place during the 1997 session
when the WLLBCs outscored GLBC members in both houses.'*^ The GLBC in 1998
made a rebound by outscoring theWLLBCs.
‘'^Bob Holmes, “Governmental Affairs,” in Georgia Legislative Review 1997, eds. Bob Holmes and Gretchen
Maclachlan (Atlanta; the Southern Center for Studies in Public Policy, 1997), 68.
“'Ibid.
“'Goro O. Mitchell and Etrenda Dillon, “Rating the Legislators,” in Georgia Legislative Review 1995, eds.
Bob Holmes and Gretchen Maclachlan (Atlanta: The Southern Center for Studies in Public Policy, 1995), 81 and Goro
O. Mitchell and Etrenda Dillon, “Rating the Legislators,” in Georgia Legislative Review 1996, eds. Bob Holmes and
Gretchen Maclachlan (Atlanta: The Southern Center for Studies in Public Policy, 1996), 82.
“^Goro O. Mitchell and Shelly Broomes, “Rating the Legislators,” in Georgia Legislative Review 1997, ed.
Bob Holmes (Atlanta: The Southern Center for Studies in Public Policy, 1997), 120.
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Sxmimary
African Americans have been historically underrepresented in Congress and the
Georgia General Assembly. Recent court rulings such as Shaw v. Reno and Miller v.
Johnson, have seriously constrained African American’s ability to seek descriptive
representation in Congress and State legislatures. Many scholars disagree about the
effectiveness of descriptive representation because it creates greater numbers of
conservative and Republican districts. These pundits which are led by Princeton’s Carol
Swain posit that black interests are best served via the creation of white represented
influence districts and evenly distributing black populations into these districts. In
opposition, the NAACP’s Legal Defense Fimd and others assert that increasing the
number of majority-black districts do not improve the fortune and political position of
conservatives and Republicans.
Studies by the Southern Center for Studies in Public Policy have suggest that
white legislators with black constituencies greater than 40 percent have voting records
that are similar to those of the GLBC members.
Black in 1978, Whitby in 1985 and 1987, Combs, Hibbing and Welch in 1994,
found that in the rural south that rural legislators and Congressperson are less supportive
of their black constituencies interests compared to their urban counterparts. Similarly,
Key in 1949, Black in 1978 and Keech in 1968 found that as BPP increased in southern
local and congressional districts, white legislators became less supportive of black
desired legislation. This phenomena has been titled the polarization effect. More
contemporary studies by Lublin in 1997 and Cameron in 1996 show that southern
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Congresspersons are responsive to their black constituencies at BPP greater than 35
percent.
CHAPTER 2
LEGISLATION OF BLACK INTERESTS
Bill Summaries
Political scientists such as Merle Black, Charles Cameron and David Lublin
have used varying methods to correlate roll call voting records with BPP to measure
Congresspersons’ responsiveness to black constituent interests. Similarly, the votes and
bills discussed in this chapter were used to establish Georgia legislators’ support of
legislation viewed as impacting black quality of life.
The summaries in this section contain votes, year introduced, bill numbers,
summary of issues, the favored vote, and rationalization for inclusion in the analysis.
The format and layout and most of the content of these summaries are based on
information contained in the “Ratings the Legislators” chapters of the Georgia
Legislative Review 1996, 1997, and 1998 editions, written by the author.'
'The summaries and bills identified are based on those originally published in Goro O. Mitchell and Etrenda
Dillon, “Rating the Legislators," in Georgia Legislative Review 1996; Goro O. Mitchell and Shelly Broomes, “Rating
the Legislators,” in Georgia Legislative Review 1997, and Goro O. Mitchell, “Rating the Legislators,” in Georgia





African Americans in Georgia in 1996 were disproportionately dependent on
Aid to Families and Dependent Children (AFDC). In an attempt to curtail welfare
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fraud, SB 446 imposes severe penalties on offenders. The bill was criticized because of
its possible adverse impacts on families, especially children, if welfare support were to
cease. The Evans (28) amendment, which narrowly passed in the House (77 to 72),
added more punitive language, including the embargo of benefits for minor offenses, to
the bill. A “no” vote is considered favorable.
Senate Bill 635
According to State Merit System statistics for 1998, a disproportionate number of
non-University System state employees are African American. Blacks make up 27 percent
of the population but represent 39.1 percent of the State government’s work force.
Approximately 48.2 percent of new ftill-time employees of the State Merit system are
African American. ‘
Senate Bill 635 makes all new employee positions filled after July 1, 1996,
unclassified and ineligible for merit system protections and due process. It passed in the
Senate 40 to 8 and the House 141 to 35. A “no” vote is considered supportive of new
hires that are disproportionately African American, and provides them with a right to due
process and protection from unfair management practices.
Senate Bill 647
Senate Bill 647 provides a point-of-service option for Georgians enrolled in health
maintenance organizations (HMOs) and permits use of the services of physicians not in
‘Processed from data contained in State of Georgia Merit System “1998 Statewide Summary,” Merit System
Reports, EO-4 Summary Report, February 23, 1999.
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HMOs. This bill passed in the Senate 48 to 6 and is considered helpftil in including
African American doctors who are underrepresented in HMOs. A “yes” vote is
considered supportive of African American medical doctors.
Senate Bill 675
This legislation grants the Commissioner of Corrections the authority to privatize
prisons. The key vote was the Ehrhart (36) amendment to end all local affirmative action
programs or minority contracting in conjunction with prison privatization, which would
set a statewide anti-affirmative action precedent. It lost in the House (67 to 99). The
“correct” vote in the House was “no” on the Ehrhart amendment to prevent eliminating
affirmative action programs.
Senate Bill 678
Figure 1 illustrates that during the period 1986 to 1997 African Americans were
three and a half times as likely to be victimized by violent crime as whites. Also,
African Americans were seven times more likely than whites to be murdered.^ Many
of the violent crimes perpetrated against African Americans are committed using
firearms.
Senate Bill 678 sought to allow the carrying of a concealed handgim. Similar to
a Kennesaw city ordinance, it also would require the purchase of one firearm per
^U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Homicide Trends in the U.S. Trends by Race,
Available: http://wwfw.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homocide/race.htm 7 July 1998.
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household in Georgia. The Black (53) substitute which lost 10 to 47 in the Senate
attempted to add language to allow the carrying of concealed weapons. Given the
disproportionate number of black victims of gun violence, a “no” vote on this
amendment is viewed as curtailing the number of guns on Georgia streets.









Figure 1. Homicide Victimization by Race 1976-1997^
House Bill 265
Georgia was one of only a few states that taxed nonluxury food items. The sales
tax on food has long been considered as regressive because low-income citizens pay the
same tax rates as upper-income consumers. Over a three-year period, HB 265 phases





1980 1985 1990 1995
^Ibid.
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51 to 1. A “yes” vote is considered favorable to assisting poor consumers who are
disproportionately African American.
House Bill 1193
House Bill 1193 was one of the most controversial bills introduced in the 1996
legislative session. The bill would promote the use of leg and arm restraints on violent
criminals. The bill was criticized as cruel and unusual punishment and a return to
Georgia’s racist past since prison populations are disproportionately African American.
The bill passed in the House 115 to 31. The vote used here was, however, on a motion to
reconsider the first vote. It lost 31 to 114. A “yes” vote is considered favorable as
opposing chain gangs.
House Bill 1283
House Bill 1283 requires hospital authorities to establish tmst funds for indigent
care upon the sale of public hospitals. The purchaser or lessee shall be responsible for
providing an equal amount and quality of care as that previously provided by the hospital.
In the Senate this bill passed unanimously (50 to 0) and in the House the bill passed 154
to 8. A “yes” vote is considered positive, because the bill would help many poor black
rural Georgians to receive health care.
House Bill 1555
According to Marc Mauer of the Washington, D.C.-based Sentencing Project,
“get tough” law enforcement policies, in concert with a lack of drug treatment programs,
are to blame for skyrocketing incarceration rates in the black community. One in three
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black males are either in custody or under the supervision of the corrections system.* The
Sentencing Project found in 1997 that the federal sentence for selling 5 grams of crack
cocaine was the same as selling 500 grams of powder cocaine. Although most crack users
are white, 90 percent of convicted crack traffickers are black. As a result, the commission
asserts that the law “results in a perception of unfairness and inconsistency.”®
House Bill 1555 would increase sentences of individuals found guilty of
distributing controlled substances. More punitive language was added in the Senate by the
McGuire (30) amendment (32 to 18), which mandates life sentences for second offenders.
Because of the disproportionate number of African Americans in prison for drug
trafficking in small amounts of crack cocaine, the bill would have a racially discriminatory
effect. Therefore, a “no” vote is viewed as an attempt to minimize the type of
disproportionate impact on African Americans that a similar federal law has had (98
percent convicted under the statute were black).
1997 Votes
Senate Bill 41
Senate Bill 41 provides for the development and implementation of school
curricula in the areas of home economics, parenting, and instruction on negative effects
“'Gaylord Shaw, “More Young Blacks in Jail Study Cites Drug Laws, Lack of Treatment,” Newsday, 5
October 1995,31.
^Washington Post, “Justices Likely to Address Disparity in Cocaine Sentencing,” The Dallas Morning News,
21 October 1997.
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of alcohol. The bill gained broad support in the Senate, passing 43 to 9, but was not
voted on in the House. A “yes” vote is considered as supporting educational programs
that provide important life skills to high-risk black youth.
Senate Bill 50
In 1996 for young African American women 15 to 19 years old the pregnancy
rate was 91.7 per 1,000. Senate Bill 50 attempts to curtail teen pregnancy rates in
Georgia by providing after-school enrichment for middle school students. The bill was
adopted by the Senate 49 to 4. A “yes” vote is considered supportive of sex education
program models designed to reduce high teen pregnancy rates.
In the House, Representative Lynn Westmoreland (104) successfully sponsored
(84 to 79) an amendment that restricts the types of curricula that can be offered in the
program’s teen pregnancy and sex education programs to State Board of Education
approved curriculums. A “no” vote on the Westmoreland amendment is considered
positive.
Senate Bill 51
Senate Bill 51 attempts to place a moratorium on the use of innovative Ebonics
curricula in state schools. Ebonics curricula recognize that many African American
students need special assistance to bridge the gap between standard English and “black
English,” and attempts to remove the stigma associated with speaking “black English.”
The bill passed 43 to 10. A “no” vote is considered supportive of iimovative
educational techniques designed to improve black literacy in Georgia.
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Senate Bill 104
Senate Bill 104 was Georgia’s new welfare plan, which repeals the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children Act (AFDC) program and replaces it with the
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). House GOP Minority Leader Bob
Irvin would not only cut off all assistance to adults after 48 months, but would cut
benefits to minors who are parents. His amendment lost in the House (78 to 88). A
“no” vote is supportive of the continued support of the children of minor parents.
Senate Bill 254
Senate Bill 254, the Patient Access to Eye Care Act, expands coverage for
Georgians with medical insurance to include eye care. It prohibits medical insurers
from discriminating against smaller eye care providers located in certain geographic
areas by allowing patients to go directly to eye care providers instead of having to be
referred by the patient’s primary physician. The bill passed the Senate 36 to 16. A
“yes” vote is viewed as increasing access to eye care for Georgians located in poor,
rural, and black communities.
Senate Bill 262
Senate Bill 262 sought to improve retraining of state workers displaced by state
privatization. The bill passed the Senate 35 to 15. A “yes” vote is considered as
positively affecting the displaced state workers, who are disproportionately black.
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Senate Bill 273
Senate Bill 273 requires voters to present a picture ID at the polls in order to
vote. The bill passed the Senate 48 to 4. The Williams (83) amendment, which lost 75
to 95 in the House, would have given poll officers the discretion to allow voting
without identification if the “poll officer has personal knowledge of the identity of the
elector.” A “no” vote on both is viewed as opposing efforts to hinder minority and
low-income voter participation in the electoral process.
House Bill 183
Many black advocacy groups maintain that law enforcement personnel
disproportionately arrest African Americans. Arrest records may affect their ability to
find employment and may have other negative consequences. House Bill 183 would
allow citizens to remove their arrest records from the state crime database if they were
not charged with a crime or if their names were mistakenly entered into the database.
The bill would allow the maintenance of these records for individuals who are held for
other charges or who are habitual criminals, such as sexual predators. The House vote
used in the analysis was the vote on the Senate substitute, 80 to 77. A “yes” vote is
considered as assisting the disproportionate number of poor and minority persons
arrested without charge to maintain a clean criminal record.
House Bill 543
African Americans’ political participation in Georgia has long been an agenda
item of many advocacy groups and organizations. House Bill 543 attempts to improve
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working class, poor, and minority Georgians electoral participation by permitting
absentee voting without having to provide a reason. The bill passed the House 91 to
83. A “yes” vote is viewed as supportive of an electoral system more accessible to
poor and working-class Georgians.
House Bill 761
According to various quality of life indices such as income levels, political
influence, and home ownership, women of color in Georgia continue to lag behind. In
response, HB 761 attempts to improve the status of Georgia women by expanding the
purview of the Georgia Commission on Women. The commission would be charged
with the compilation and dissemination of studies to members of the General Assembly
and the organization of conferences, hearings, and other events to improve the status of
women in Georgia. The bill passed the House 107 to 49. A “yes” vote is viewed as
supporting the improvement of the quality of life of poor and minority women.
1998 Votes
Senate Bill 55
Approximately, 4.6 percent of Georgia residents suffer from diabetes. For
every two diagnosed, one goes undetected. There are an estimated 247,000 cases in the
state—143,750white and 103,759 black.® A disproportionate number of African
^Jeny Fox, Georgia Department of Human Resources, Division of Public Health, interviewed by author, 5
June 1998, in Goro Mitchell, “Rating the Legislators,” Georgia Legislative Review 1998, 119.
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Americans in Georgia have diabetes. Senate Bill 55 mandates that medical insurance
providers cover certain diabetes-related costs. In the House, the West (101) amendment
attempted to expand the bill to include coverage for transport and emergency treatment.
The amendment lost 28 to 137. A “yes” vote on the West amendment is viewed as
supporting expanded diabetes coverage to disproportionately affected African
Americans.
Senate Bill 410
Senate Bill 410 recognizes that a large proportion of school-age children in
Georgia do not have access to medical treatment, which can hinder a child's ability to
reach his/her full physical and educational potential. The bill, “PeachCare for Kids
Act,” provides for the establishment of a children's health insurance program. The
vote used is the Brown (130) amendment, an attempt to reduce the number of children
covered by the legislation, which lost 64 to 111. A “no” vote on this amendment is
seen as supportive of increased health care provision for poor children.
Senate Bill 420
Senate Bill 420 was an attempt to increase the price of milk by creating a
Southern Dairy Compact. Advocates for poor Georgians were vehemently opposed to
the bill and even its proponents admitted it would increase dairy prices.’ The bill
^Georgians for Children, “Eight Reasons to Stop the Milk Tax: Why Georgians Should Not Join a Dairy
Compact” (undated) in Goro Mitchell “Rating the Legislators,” Georgia Legislative Review 1998, 121.
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passed the Senate 36 to 17 and the House 130 to 44. A “no” vote is viewed as
supportive of maintaining current dairy prices at reasonable levels, thus benefiting poor
Black Georgians.
Senate Bill 432
This bill would increase the state minimum wage to $5.15 by the year 2000.
The bill lost in the Senate 19 to 35. A “yes” vote is viewed as an attempt to improve
the economic status of poor Black Georgians.
Senate Resolution 463
Senate Resolution 463 was a proposed constitutional amendment to abolish
parole for certain crimes. The amendment could have serious negative consequences
for African Americans who make up 70 percent of the prison population. Although the
amendment passed in the Senate 40 to 16, it was later tied up in conference committee.
A “no” vote is considered supportive of curtailing an increase in the disproportionately
high number of African Americans in Georgia prisons.
House Bill 1101
House Bill 1101 would regulate hospital authorities in Georgia. Senator Ralston
(51) sought to amend the bill to end affirmative action programs in Georgia hospital
authorities and other political jurisdictions that now have affirmative action programs.
The amendment was defeated 21 to 32.
The vote in the House is the Walker (141) amendment to the Wiles/Ehrhart
amendment, which added language that would allow some preferences albeit not gender
37
and race-based (98 to 53). A “yes” on the Walker amendment and a “no” on the
Ralston amendment are considered supportive of equalizing the playing field for blacks
and other minorities in Georgia.
House Bill 1162
House Bill 1162 would enact a $205 million income tax break. While the
Culbreth amendment would abolish the income tax, representing a $4.2 billion revenue
loss for the state, the Walker (141) amendment to the Culbreth amendment deleted the
income tax abolishment language and passed 103 to 72. A “yes” vote on the Walker
amendment is viewed as supporting and maintaining services that assist poor and
minority communities that would be cut if the state income tax were abolished.
House Bill 1529
House Bill 1529 was an attempt to change the election law provision so that a
statewide office can be attained by a plurality vote of 45 percent in the general election.
The votes employed in the analysis are on the Fort (39) amendment in the Senate and
the Williams (48) amendment in the House. Both amendments established a 45 percent
threshold requirement for primary elections. This would offer more opportunities for
minority candidates to win party nominations. The Williams amendment lost 84 to 91,
and the Fort amendment lost 23 to 32. A “yes” vote on both amendments is viewed as
supportive of an election system that would increase the opportunities for minorities to
attain party nominations for statewide offices and win general elections.
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House Bill 1565
Chlamydia is a sexually transmitted disease that may cause serious
complications, such as pelvic inflammation, infertility, stillbirths, low birth-weight
babies, and serious physical and mental conplications. African Americans suffer
disproportionately from the infection. As Figure 2 illustrates, the incidence of
Chlamydia is almost four times higher among blacks than whites in Georgia. House
Bill 1565 would require health insurers to provide for Chlamydia screening. The tests
would be administered in conjunction with annual pap smears. The bill passed the
Senate 34 to 19. A “yes” vote is supportive of the health of women of color in Georgia.
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Figure 2. Incidence of Chlamydia in Georgia by Race January 1997 to December 1997*
^Georgia Department of Human Resources, Division of Public Health, Chlamydia Query, “Incidence of
Clamydia January 1997 to December 1997.”
CHAPTER 3
REPRESENTING BLACK INTERESTS
BPP and Legislators Support ofBlack Interests
The purpose of the analyses in Chapter 3 is to test the validity of the hypothesis
stated in chapter one, which are;
Hi White legislators in rural areas are less responsive to black political interests than
white urban legislators with similar Black Percentage Populations (BPPs).
H2 White urban legislators with district BPP of 30-50 percent have voting records on
legislation affecting blacks comparable to those ofGLBC members with similar BPPs.
H3 There is a linear functional relationship between BPP and white legislator support for
legislation that positively impacts black quality of life.
H4 Black political agendas are best served by majority-black districts.
Hypothesis three stated that there is a linear functional relationship between BPP
and white legislator support for legislation that positively impacts black quality of life.
The purpose of the following analysis is to determine if the independent variable black
population percentage (BPP) has a functional impact on legislators’ voting patterns.
There are 146 white state representatives in the House. The average score for
these representatives on a 100 scale was 43.45 (see chapter one for details on rating
methodology). As Table 2 illustrates, in the House there is a correlative increase in
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average scores and BPP. Employing the Pearson Product-Moment Correlation
Coefficient r, a measure of strength of the linear relationship between two variables (BPP
averages to average scores) reveals a positive correlation of .95 between BPP and scores
in white represented districts (note 1.0 is a perfectly linear correlation). Thus one can
infer that BPP in House districts has a positive functional impact on representatives’
support of legislation identified as impacting black interests.








AU 146 17.91% 43.45
0-10% 56 4.51% 32.57
10.1-20% 37 15.55% 46.88
20.1-30% 26 25.45% 48.76
30.1-40% 15 35.64% 49.67
40.1-50% 6 43.53% 63.01
>50.1 % 6 54.99% 65.79
The same data from the Senate reveals less of a linear relationship compared to
the House (see Table 2) Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficient r shows a
positive linear correlation between BPP of 0.82 (see Figure 4).
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Figure 3. BPP’s Effect on White Representatives’ Scores








All 45 18.42% 48.68
0-10% 14 4.81% 46.86
10.1-20% 13 14.07% 47.04
20.1-30% 9 24.88% 45.72
30.1-40% 5 34.49% 54.49
40.1-50% 3 43.60% 61.16
>50.1 % 1 51.46% 55.60
In sum, there is a positive linear correlation between BPP levels in white
legislators’ districts and their support of black interests in both houses as reflected in their
voting histories. Therefore, hypothesis three is accepted.
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The relationship between BPP and voting is more linear in the House in than in
the Senate. The findings show that the polarization affect asserted by Merle Black, V. O.
Key and other scholars is not evident in the Georgia Legislature
Figure 4. BPP’s Effect on White Senators’ Scores
Rural Versus Urban
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Hypothesis one stated that white legislators in rural areas are less responsive to
black political interests than white urban legislators with similar BPPs. This analysis will
ascertain if white urban legislators are more responsive to their black constituency than
rural legislators. Tables 4 and 5 show that there is no discemable difference between the
aggregate average scores in the House for both groups. White rural House members had
an average score of 43.45 score and their urban counterparts 43.53. Similarly, the
average BPP for urban and rural districts is also very similar. Urban average BPP is
17.79 and rural 17.91 percent.








AU 80 17.79% 43.53
0-10% 41 4.61% 27.80
10.1-20% 23 15.32% 48.35
20.1-30% 8 23.78% 52.13
30.1-40% 2 32.02% 41.70
40.1-50% 2 43.30% 61.16
>50.1 % 4 55.08% 76.45
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AU 66 17.91% 43.45
0-10% 15 4.26% 45.59
10.1-20% 14 15.91% 44.48
20.1-30% 18 26.19% 47.26
30.1-40% 13 36.19% 50.90
40.1-50% 4 43.65% 63.94
>50.1 % 2 54.83% 44.48
The geographic boundaries of House districts are shown in Figure 5. Rural
districts are distinguished from urban districts by their larger geographic size, which is
reflective of lower population density per square mile. Figure 5 shows that the high and
low scores are almost evenly distributed between urban and rural districts.
Rural Senators outscored urban Senators 56.22 to 48.68. This may be due to the
larger average black population in rural Senatorial districts or that they are more likely to
be Democrats. As the data shows, rural white Senators’ districts have an average BPP of
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Figure 5. House Scores by District Geography








All 36 15.09% 48.68
0-10% 14 4.81% 46.86
10.1-20% 12 13.90% 45.41
20.1-30% 5 24.97% 42.26
30.1-40% 2 33.62% 52.82
40.1-50% 1 43.44% 72.28
>50.1 % 1 51.46% 55.6
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All 9 31.73% 56.22
0-10% 0 0 0
10.1-20% 1 16.15% 66.72
20.1-30% 3 25.64% 53.75
30.1-40% 3 35.07% 55.6
40.1-50% 2 43.66% 55.6
>50.1 % 0 0 0
Similar to phenomenon present in Figure 5, Figure 6 geographically illustrates
that high and low scores are evenly distributed among high-density urban Senate districts
(smaller land area) and low density rural ones (larger land areas). Therefore, there is no
measurable difference between white urban and rural legislators’ representation of black
interests and hypothesis one is rejected.
These findings also contradict studies by Combs, Ribbing and Welch and Whitby
in 1985 and 1987, which found that the polarization effect was prevalent in the rural
south.' They found that as black constituencies increased in rural legislative districts, the
less supportive white elective officials were ofblack interests.
'Charles Cameron, David Epstein and Sharyn Halloran, “Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize
Substantive Black Representation in Congress Substantive Black Representation in Congress?” 796.
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Figure 6. Senate Scores by District Geography
A Comparison of Black and White Legislator Support ofBlack Interests
Hypotheses two stated that white urban legislators with district BPP of 30-50
percent have voting records on legislation affecting blacks comparable to those of GLBC
members with similar BPPs. And hypothesis four asserted that black political agendas
are best served by majority-black districts. This analysis attempts to test the validity of
these hypotheses by comparing the voting records ofGLBC members with those ofwhite
legislators representing black influence districts.
The black population in Georgia in 1998 was estimated to be 1,746,565 (27
percent) and the total population ofGeorgia 6,487,216. The average population of House
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districts was 36,015. There were 33 black representatives in the House who had an
average score of 71.44. The Senate average district population is 115,843. In 1998, there
were 11 black senators in the legislative body with an average score of 70.26.




















AU 33 146 69.00% 17.91% 71.44 43.45
0-10% 1 56 18.94 4.51% 72.28 32.57
10.1-20% 0 37 0 15.55% 0 46.88
20.1-30% 0 26 0 25.45% 0 48.76
30.1-40% 0 15 0 35.64% 0 49.67
40.1-50% 2 6 43.67 43.53% 69.5 63.01
>50.1 % 30 6 71.26 54.99% 71.5 65.79




















AU 11 45 63.99% 18.42% 70.26 48.68
0-10% 0 14 0 4.81% 0 46.86
10.1-20% 0 13 0 14.07% 0 47.04
20.1-30% 0 9 0 24.88% 0 45.72
30.1-40% 0 5 0 34.49% 0 54.49
40.1-50% 1 3 40.64 43.60% 77.84 61.16
>50.1 % 10 1 66.33 51.46% 69.5 55.60
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As Tables 7 and 8 illustrate, comparing white-represented influence and
GLBC districts’ average scores is problematic. Influence districts are defined as white-
represented districts with a BPP between 30-50 percent. There is only one GLBC
represented Senate district and two GLBC House districts that have BPP between 40-50
percent and no GLBC districts with 30-40 percent BPP. Therefore, there is an inadequate
amount of data to perform comparisons of average scores. The House GLBC scores do
suggests that black representatives gamer high scores even at BPP levels less than 50
percent. Therefore, results are inconclusive regarding hypotheses two and four.
CHAPTER 4
MAXIMIZING BLACK DESCRIPTIVE AND SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION
The results presented in Chapter three provides the following three conclusions:
1) there is a strong linear functional relationship between BPP and white lawmaker
support for legislation considered beneficial to black interests; 2) There is no discemable
difference in rural and urban white legislators’ support for black interest; and 3) black
legislators are supportive of black interests at all levels of BPP. Operationalizing these
findings within the context of past GLBC Georgia reapportionment efforts and recent
racial districting Supreme Court decisions, it is possible to make some general
recommendations to maximize black substantive representation in the Georgia General
Assembly.
Joint Maximizing Strategy
David Lublin suggests that, “most discussions present racial redistricting as an
all-or-nothing choice between two competing visions or value systems...Jointly
maximizing descriptive and substantive representation will most likely require
withdrawing partially from the maximization strategy proposed during the 1990
redistricting round.’’* In devising new districts plans, African American legislators
1
XV.
David Lublin, The Paradox ofRepresentation: Racial Gerrymandering and Minority Interests in Congress^
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redistricting round.”’ In devising new districts plans, African American legislators
should be mindful that maximizing the number of majority-black districts might tip the
balance of power between Democrats and Republicans, which could negatively affect
black substantive representation. Given the fact that the white legislators are responsive
to their black constituencies, influence district may be an effective alternative where
majority-black districts are unattainable.
Also, African Americans may seek to run in and gamer majority-white districts,
Charles Cameron, David Epstein and Sharyn Halloran assert that blacks in the south have
a good chance to be elected in districts with less than 50 BVAP. Furthermore, Carol
Swain opines that racial redistricting advocates overestimate white racism and that the
election of Douglas Wilder in Virginia and Alan Wheat in Missouri proves that blacks
can be elected in white majority districts and that the creation of majority-black districts
prevents the black electorate the opportimity to elect black representatives to white
districts. Examples of this phenomenon in Georgia include the reelection of
Congresspersons Cynthia McKinney (4“’ district) and Sanford Bishop (2"‘’ district). There
are a number of other examples of black political successes in majority white
'David Lublin, The Paradox ofRepresentation: Racial Gerrymandering and Minority Interests in Congress,
XV.
^Charles Cameron, David Epstein and Sharyn Halloran, “Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize
Substantive Black Representation in Congress?” 794.
^David Lublin, The Paradox ofRepresentation: Racial Gerrymandering and Minority Interests in Congress,
41.
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jurisdictions. But many of these elected officials were politically established in safe
black districts first. Examples include Carol Mosley-Braun, David Dinkins, and others."*
David Bositis showed that all incumbent black major Congressional candidates in the
South who ran in majority districts won.^
Bernard Grofinan laments that “...in the South, blacks are very unlikely to be
elected from any districts that are not majority-minority.”^ Empirical evidence shows
that nationally 5,007 of 5,079 elections held in majority white Congressional districts
were won by whites. Over the same period, African Americans won 200 of 219 elections
in majority-black districts.’
Although the evidence shows that black candidates seeking to represent majority-
white districts fortunes may be limited, where possible, majority black districts may be
targeted for the lowering of BPP in order to place black incumbents in districts of 40-50
BPP. Currently, in the Georgia Legislature there are three House and one Senate district
with less than 50 percent BPP represented by African Americans. As such, black
“'Richard H. Pildes, Book Review, 1376.
^David Bositis, “The Future of Majority-Minority Districts and Black and Hispanic Legislative
Representation,” in Redistricting and Minority Representation: Learning from the Past, Preparing for the Future, ed.
David Bositis (Lanham: University Press of America, 1998), 17.
^Richard H. Pildes, Book Review, 1376.
41.
’David Lublin, The Paradox ofRepresentation: Racial Gerrymandering and Minority Interests in Congress,
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candidates may target the six House and three Senate districts with BPP between 40 and
50 percent.
Moreover, a reapportionment strategy may be established which creates more of
these “winnable” majority-white districts. GLBC members’ support of legislation that
increases black voter participation is crucial, especially in efforts to win districts with
BPP between 40 and 50 percent. Examples include legislation that promotes early voting
and voting by mail.
Figure 7. BPP Levels in Metro Atlanta House Districts
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Clearly, the current average BPP in black represented districts of 63.91 percent in
the Senate and 66.33 percent in the House can be reapportioned to increase the number of
“normally shaped” black districts. According to Bob Holmes redistributing black
populations, for the most part is impossible in Atlanta because other majority-black
districts surround many of these districts.* The only districts where redistribution of BPP
is possible are those located on the perimeter of packed districts. Figure 7 illustrates this
phenomenon. Neighboring white House districts which have BPP of 10 to 40 percent
and are ripe for the addition ofblack populations.
GLBC Redistricting Strategic Planning
Crucial to the maximizing the substantive black representation through majority-
black and black influence districts is the development and implementation of a well-
conceived and proven redistricting strategy. The GLBC should proactively engage in
strategic redistricting planning. According to Bob Holmes, during the 1991 Georgia
legislative redistricting effort, the GLBC employed a five-technique strategy to maximize
the number of majority-black districts. These techniques included: 1) negotiation with
the white legislative leadership; 2) formulation of alternative reapportionment plans for
submittal to committees; 3) threats to appeal to the DOJ or file suit; 4) negotiation with
Republicans to achieve common goals; and 5) the use of GLBC reapportionment
members “insiders,” and other GLBC members “outsiders” to exert influence on the
Bob Holmes Interviewed by the Author, 24 September 1999.
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apportionment process.^ To avoid the failure inherent to the 1995 round of redistricting,
the GLBC should implement all of the above techniques. Holmes asserts because all of
these techniques were not employed and the lack of cohesive support by the majority of
GLBC members diminished the opportunity of gaining nine new majority-black districts
in 1995.*°
A Case for Alternative Electoral Systems
The above discussion on increasing black substantive representation by inflating
the number of majority-black districts may be a moot issue because of a number of
Supreme Court decisions handed down this decade. The DOJ’s role as policeman to
ensure descriptive representation has been greatly diminished. The legal precedents set
forth in Shaw v. Reno (1993) severely constrains racial redistricting in Georgia. In
Johnson vMiller (1994) a Georgia Federal District Court in invalidating a majority-black
congressional district, stated that “the time has come to contemplate more innovative
means to ensure minority representation in democratic institutions.”* * Professors Richard
L. Engstrom and Jason F. Kirksey, believe that:
’Bob Holmes, “Reapportionment Strategies in the 1990s: The Case of Georgia,” in Race and Redistricting in
the 1990s, ed. Bernard Grofman (New York; Agathon Press, 1998), 192.
'“Ibid., 226.
^^Johnson v. Miller, 864 F.supp 1354, 1393 (S.D. Ga 1994) in Richard L. Engstrom and Jason F. Kirksey,
“Race and Representational Districting in Louisiana,” in Race and Redistricting in the 1990s, 266.
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Multi-seat election systems, such as limited, cumulative, or preference voting,
could be employed to provide opportunities for not just geographically
concentrated groups to elect candidates of their choice, but geographically
dispersed groups as well.'^
PR voting systems promote descriptive and substantive minority
representation by creating multi-member districts, thus minority groups can win seats
based on their voting strength.'^
In response, representative Bob Holmes and the GLBC introduced and supported
legislation in 1997 and 1998 that seeks to implement cumulative voting in the election of
Congresspersons. Holmes introduced similar legislation during the 1999 session that
attempted to institute a similar system for the election of state legislators. Although
multi-member districts under a PR system may increase black representation, it alone is
not a panacea. Financial support from special interests makes incumbents almost
imbeatable. Similarly, the influence of these interests may directly affect legislator¬
voting habits. These interests may also be in direct opposition to the interests of black
Georgians. Black legislative campaigns are clearly under funded in comparison to their
white counterparts. As such, to help ensure black substantive representation in the
Georgia General Assembly, PR would have to be married to campaign finance reform.
'hbid, 267.
'^Rob Richie and Steven Hill, “When Majority is a Minority,” The Christian Science Monitor, 2 March 1999.
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HOUSE DISTRICT RACIAL, DENSITY CHARACTERISTICS AND SCORES
District Totai BVAP BP% Area Population Urban/ MSA/ Race Score
# Pop % sq per square Rural Non
miles mile MSA
1 37647 1.59% 1.59% 15.78 2,386 2 1 1 16.68
2 37583 4.66% 4.68% 17.78 2,114 2 1 1 55.60
3 37775 0.88% 0.89% 11.93 3,166 1 1 1 27.80
4 36307 4.97% 5.18% 12.71 2,856 1 1 1 38.92
5 36155 2.57% 2.82% 10.39 3,481 1 2 1 22.24
6 35489 0.09% 0.12% 22.29 1,592 2 2 1 66.72
7 34591 0.82% 0.81% 29.20 1,185 2 2 1 33.36
8 34898 0.23% 0.21% 30.66 1,138 2 2 1 55.60
9 36124 5.84% 5.27% 18.91 1,911 2 2 1 27.80
10 35072 3.48% 3.77% 18.22 1,925 2 2 1 50.04
11 37782 5.54% 5.99% 23.39 1,616 2 1 1 72.28
12 37776 21.12% 24.47% 5.75 6,573 1 2 1 44.48
13 37758 5.79% 6.20% 17.33 2,179 2 1 1 72.28
14 37773 9.26% 9.62% 15.08 2,504 1 1 1 22.24
15 34600 0.89% 0.87% 21.04 1,644 2 1 1 22.24
16 35400 3.02% 3.08% 10.06 3,518 1 1 1 22.24
17 34636 1.59% 1.59% 8.66 3,999 1 1 1 27.80
18 34483 5.79% 6.22% 23.27 1,482 2 1 1 00.00
19 34716 0.27% 0.35% 18.73 1,853 2 2 1 66.72
20 35762 16.64% 18.97% 9.31 3,843 1 2 1 50.04
21 34432 3.13% 3.19% 12.69 2,713 1 1 1 16.68
22 35035 8.43% 9.19% 20.08 1,745 2 2 1 55.60
23 34892 13.90% 16.09% 21.68 1,609 2 2 1 50.04
24 36366 9.38% 10.17% 17.58 2,069 2 1 1 27.80
25 34505 9.15% 9.57% 18.69 1,846 2 2 1 38.92
26 34384 3.32% 3.57% 11.91 2,888 1 1 1 16.68
27 37786 12.38% 13.49% 1 1 1 61.16
28 37395 0.05% 0.04% 13.84 2,702 1 1 1 22.24
29 37592 11.79% 13.51% 4.21 8,921 1 1 1 44.48
30 36420 13.30% 14.68% 3.51 10,380 1 1 1 33.36
31 36729 3.05% 3.10% 4.32 8,512 1 1 1 16.68
32 37694 20.46% 23.34% 5.20 7,250 1 1 1 22.24
33 35054 18.52% 20.50% 4.91 7,138 1 1 1 50.04
34 35128 6.28% 6.70% 6.71 5,233 1 1 1 22.24
35 37704 10.79% 12.59% 3.59 10,513 1 1 1 22.24
36 35584 8.39% 9.11% 6.77 5,260 1 1 1 22.24
37 37468 3.36% 3.29% 3.94 9,510 1 1 1 22.24
38 37713 3.38% 3.56% 7.36 5,125 1 1 1 50.04
39 37410 3.08% 3.18% 4.22 8,868 1 1 1 22.24
40 37693 3.78% 4.02% 4.43 8,504 1 1 1 27.80
41 34368 2.09% 2.13% 9.11 3,773 1 1 1 27.80
42 37716 3.98% 4.23% 5.29 7,130 1 1 1 33.36
43 35604 8.11% 8.94% 3.91 9,105 1 1 1 38.92
44 36985 3.72% 3.91% 5.03 7,357 1 1 1 22.24
45 37150 5.32% 5.43% 5.21 7,126 1 1 1 22.24
46 35360 5.73% 5.46% 3.47 10,203 1 1 1 38.92
47 37015 13.21% 13.65% 2.83 13,067 1 1 1 77.84
48 37711 75.94% 81.67% 2.77 13,627 1 1 2 72.28
49 37033 81.52% 84.19% 2.52 14,672 1 1 2 72.28
50 34846 76.93% 79.70% 3.66 9,513 1 1 2 77.84
51 37795 81.29% 84.46% 4.62 8,185 1 1 2 50.04
52 35120 76.20% 79.04% 11.27 3,116 1 1 2 66.72
53 39999 87.46% 89.40% 4.65 8,606 1 1 2 77.84
54 35980 89.32% 91.15% 3.46 10,401 1 2 2 83.40
55 34663 53.87% 59.95% 3.43 10,116 1 2 2 55.60



































































36075 68.82% 75.19% 3.82 9,452 1 2 2 72.28
37775 56.33% 60.45% 8.13 4,647 1 2 2 61.16
35808 9.61% 9.95% 3.41 10,493 1 1 1 22.24
34244 8.27% 9.20% 3.81 8,982 1 1 1 22.24
36241 14.32% 15.31% 3.14 11,538 1 1 1 83.40
34536 17.92% 19.84% 3.56 9,709 1 1 1 72.28
37132 3.28% 3.94% 4.03 9,208 1 1 1 38.92
37388 17.18% 18.94% 5.21 7,172 1 1 2 72.28
36363 26.97% 29.34% 3.43 10,615 1 1 1 61.16
34846 49.21% 52.46% 2.83 12,322 1 1 1 83.40
35666 6.34% 7.28% 3.34 10,666 1 1 1 83.40
34700 89.35% 91.55% 2.60 13,355 1 1 2 66.72
34401 72.49% 76.67% 2.87 12,006 1 1 2 77.84
35146 62.39% 67.42% 3.21 10,953 1 1 2 72.28
35387 61.42% 64.90% 4.64 7,633 1 1 2 72.28
34486 88.84% 90.91% 4.15 8,302 1 1 2 77.84
34364 81.57% 85.54% 5.33 6,446 1 1 2 61.16
34212 4.04% 4.23% 9.69 3,529 1 2 1 33.36
35008 21.82% 24.47% 8.09 4,329 1 1 1 61.16
34964 1.11% 1.15% 4.57 7,646 1 1 1 16.68
35448 1.34% 1.51% 4.33 8,188 1 1 1 22.24
34920 11.58% 12.12% 3.18 10,979 1 1 1 16.68
36226 11.60% 12.13% 4.22 8,577 1 1 1 22.24
37590 5.15% 5.28% 6.61 5,683 1 1 1 33.36
36034 6.12% 6.52% 4.48 8,037 1 1 1 27.80
34215 2.41% 2.45% 6.27 5,454 1 1 1 22.24
34586 0.61% 0.73% 4.75 7,284 1 1 1 27.80
36053 3.57% 3.86% 8.24 4,374 1 1 1 16.68
34813 4.77% 4.85% 10.98 3,172 1 1 1 27.80
34217 9.22% 9.91% 13.87 2,467 2 1 1 27.80
34286 18.73% 20.34% 17.20 1,994 2 1 1 11.12
36290 12.62% 16.03% 6.56 5,533 1 1 1 77.84
35988 35.74% 42.42% 5.10 7,057 1 1 2 77.84
36988 33.55% 36.37% 32.06 1,154 2 2 1 38.92
36774 16.60% 17.31% 24.53 1,499 2 1 1 77.84
35535 22.70% 24.67% 12.68 2,803 1 1 1 72.28
37075 50.05% 52.90% 4.33 8,557 1 1 1 61.16
36073 17.85% 21.46% 4.46 8,089 1 1 1 72.28
36949 12.18% 13.59% 1 1 1 44.48
37314 14.92% 17.45% 3.73 9,997 1 1 1 72.28
34641 12.39% 13.03% 9.04 3,833 1 1 1 61.16
36038 9.21% 10.26% 7.12 5,060 1 1 1 16.68
35082 5.02% 5.42% 11.63 3,017 1 1 1 22.24
37138 12.58% 14.07% 12.97 2,864 1 1 1 72.28
34284 16.61% 17.52% 17.33 1,978 2 1 1 72.28
34535 21.81% 22.49% 24.19 1,428 2 1 1 22.24
37637 24.66% 27.27% 19.98 1,884 2 1 1 22.24
36990 6.31% 6.89% 13.00 2,844 1 1 1 22.24
36019 4.35% 4.53% 10.56 3,412 1 1 1 16.68
36255 15.97% 17.90% 14.51 2,498 2 1 1 16.68
37661 28.43% 31.24% 12.82 2,938 1 1 1 16.68
35882 4.71% 4.95% 10.50 3,418 1 1 1 27.80
37687 32.46% 33.75% 19.54 1,929 2 1 1 61.16
34366 28.62% 29.74% 31.25 1,100 2 1 1 50.04
35693 32.64% 36.57% 33.54 1,064 2 1 1 50.04
36453 16.26% 16.34% 20.62 1,768 2 1 1 16.68
36887 5.95% 5.96% 5.70 6,476 1 2 1 33.36
35226 15.03% 15.34% 5.17 6,812 1 1 1 33.36
34515 29.38 32.79% 3.73 9,263 1 1 1 66.72
35534 48.75% 52.83% 29.40 1,209 2 1 2 77.84
35049 61.61% 65.66% 3.68 9,518 1 1 2 66.72
34628 65.91% 69.63% 5.73 6,047 1 1 2 66.72
35346 19.33% 22.01% 11.51 3,072 1 1 1 33.36
35140 51.53% 56.05% 34.43 1,021 2 1 1 38.92





























































36458 40.17% 42.94% 13.01 2,802 1 1 1 66.72
35191 34.15% 36.69% 30.75 1,144 2 1 1 61.16
36722 62.46% 68.26% 4.53 8,105 1 2 2 50.04
37061 15.20% 16.89% 11.46 3,234 1 2 1 22.24
36285 16.24% 18.89% 5.66 6,411 1 2 1 66.72
35854 62.43% 66.76% 3.52 10,176 1 2 2 77.84
37677 23.26% 25.35% 21.14 1,783 2 1 1 44.48
36524 23.94% 25.53% 22.59 1,617 2 2 1 44.48
35946 14.18% 15.45% 18.42 1,951 2 1 1 22.24
37403 45.74% 50.27% 22.78 1,642 2 2 2 77.84
37749 6.08% 7.20% 7.01 5,383 1 1 1 38.92
34655 54.11% 56.73% 21.63 1,602 2 1 2 83.40
34415 51.51% 56.91% 3.58 9,605 1 1 2 77.84
35256 16.53% 19.26% 3.77 9,343 1 1 1 66.72
36687 59.81% 63.22% 3.68 9,965 1 1 2 83.40
36992 36.14% 40.01% 21.47 1,723 2 2 1 66.72
35506 33.35% 38.00% 28.34 1,253 2 1 1 66.72
37040 11.03% 13.39% 4.76 7,787 1 1 1 44.48
35396 58.41% 61.36% 31.43 1,126 2 1 2 72.28
36590 23.90% 26.03% 2 1 1 61.16
36782 24.29% 26.74% 30.56 1,204 2 2 1 61.16
36638 31.05% 34.69% 23.21 1,579 2 2 1 72.28
34869 28.51% 32.99% 33.46 1,042 2 2 1 72.28
36159 23.90% 27.54% 32.29 1,120 2 2 1 27.80
36799 31.60% 36.13% 27.82 1,323 2 2 1 27.80
36001 13.85% 15.11% 27.26 1,321 2 1 1 61.16
37471 59.35% 64.27% 3.37 11,133 1 1 2 66.72
34416 67.43% 71.95% 4.90 7,029 1 1 2 72.28
34478 15.90% 16.89% 14.35 2,402 2 1 1 61.16
36334 46.88% 51.65% 2.90 12,519 1 1 1 72.28
36680 16.93% 19.54% 11.22 3,271 1 1 1 33.36
37556 4.78% 5.34% 15.10 2,487 2 1 1 22.24
37525 27.61% 29.18% 30.14 1,245 2 1 1 33.36
36138 22.70% 28.28% 29.27 1,234 2 2 1 61.16
35561 24.74% 28.47% 31.69 1,122 2 2 1 66.72
36396 32.40% 37.18% 29.44 1,236 2 1 1 66.72
36184 42.61% 45.90% 37.76 958 2 1 1 66.72
36593 41.95% 44.74% 38.11 960 2 1 1 61.16
34547 34.84% 39.31% 33.42 1,034 2 2 1 61.16
35637 62.67% 67.10% 27.83 1,280 2 1 2 83.40
35772 56.13% 60.52% 9.08 3,939 1 1 2 72.28
34797 15.47% 18.43% 7.12 4,890 1 1 1 16.68
35570 38.99% 43.93% 26.97 1,319 2 2 1 61.16
37481 16.75% 19.81% 17.06 2,197 2 2 1 33.36
34869 15.70% 18.30% 27.67 1,260 2 2 1 61.16
35805 22.83% 25.59% 29.80 1,201 2 2 1 66.72
35471 23.49% 26.04% 29.19 1,215 2 2 1 77.84
37099 9.35% 11.11% 40.66 912 2 2 1 50.04
37106 16.39% 18.57% 35.81 1,036 2 2 1 44.48
35333 25.99% 28.19% 30.21 1,169 2 2 1 55.60
34848 33.43% 36.33% 17.26 2,019 2 2 1 22.24
37848 41.32% 44.91% 26.17 1,420 2 2 2 61.16
35403 10.55% 12.17% 22.29 1,589 2 2 1 27.80
35535 21.29% 22.39% 28.82 1,233 2 2 1 22.24
34230 22.28% 24.73% 34.16 1,002 2 2 1 50.04
36977 38.20% 43.65% 4.85 7,631 1 2 1 55.60
34197 24.94% 27.60% 33.42 1,023 2 2 1 72.28
34686 30.32% 33.96% 27.06 1,282 2 2 1 27.80
36407 34.94% 38.54% 20.38 1,786 2 2 1 33.36
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APPENDIX B
SENATE DISTRICTRACIAL, DENSITY CHARACTERISTICS AND SCORES
District Totai BVAP % BP% Area Pop per Rural/ MSA/ Race Score
# Pop SQ mile SQ mile Urban
1 113,517 10.28% 11.62% 24.72 4,591 1 1 1 38.92
2 110,873 58.95% 63.14% 11.29 9,824 1 1 2 66.72
3 111,231 34.26% 37.17% 44.68 2,489 2 1 1 50.04
4 117,347 25.03% 27.79% 51.65 2,272 2 1 1 55.60
5 117,197 5.69% 5.90% 7.39 15,867 1 1 1 50.04
6 120,569 14.23% 16.15% 52.28 2,306 2 2 1 66.72
7 115,768 20.97% 23.12% 65.82 1,759 2 2 1 61.16
8 119,031 27.80% 31.25% 36.84 3,231 1 2 1 50.04
9 120,450 2.31% 2.39% 9.94 12,117 1 1 1 33.36
10 109,927 70.52% 74.55% 6.76 16,253 1 1 2 72.28
11 129,946 37.23% 41.59% 53.07 2,449 2 2 1 61.16
12 118,535 46.50% 51.46% 40.81 2,905 1 1 1 55.60
13 120,608 26.32% 30.63% 48.66 2,479 2 2 1 55.60
14 110,581 42.71% 45.72% 52.72 2,098 2 1 1 50.04
15 110,675 53.31% 56.79% 18.36 6,027 1 1 2 66.72
16 115,439 16.75% 18.62% 35.46 3,256 1 1 1 50.04
17 111,440 12.05% 12.29% 25.84 4,313 1 1 1 50.04
18 115,793 19.53% 22.11% 28.88 4,010 1 1 1 38.92
19 110,904 23.18% 26.00% 54.18 2,047 2 2 1 44.48
20 110,707 33.52% 37.40% 55.92 1,980 2 2 1 61.16
21 121,377 3.60% 3.73% 7.74 15,691 1 1 1 38.92
22 111,024 54.53% 58.80% 8.46 13,117 1 1 2 77.84
23 121,026 26.51% 29.68% 42.62 2,840 1 1 1 33.36
24 113,952 20.84% 21.72% 40.32 2,826 1 1 1 38.92
25 117,956 37.80% 40.64% 51.35 2,297 2 1 2 77.84
26 112,127 53.45% 58.19% 29.18 3,843 1 1 2 66.72
27 115,671 20.35% 21.66% 35.84 3,227 1 1 1 27.80
28 118,623 12.93% 14.03% 26.33 4,506 1 1 1 38.92
29 118,456 32.67% 35.99% 37.21 3,183 1 1 1 55.60
30 121,367 11.72% 12.68% 24.81 4,892 1 1 1 33.36
31 120,667 8.28% 8.89% 31.15 3,873 1 1 1 55.60
32 114,655 8.66% 9.47% 7.24 15,833 1 1 1 38.92
33 119,753 17.72% 19.65% 8.80 13,608 1 1 1 55.60
34 121,196 9.48% 10.43% 16.60 7,302 1 1 1 22.24
35 109,880 63.75% 68.42% 11.36 9,673 1 1 2 72.28
36 110,151 64.02% 70.26% 5.32 20,705 1 1 2 66.72
37 121,230 3.84% 4.06% 12.96 9,353 1 1 1 33.36
38 110,231 78.73% 81.22% 7.42 14,848 1 1 2 55.60
39 110,691 59.31% 64.31% 5.09 21,746 1 1 2 72.28
40 111,380 6.05% 6.22% 7.32 15,215 1 1 1 55.60
41 115,563 10.25% 10.93% 6.97 16,586 1 1 1 55.60
42 110,176 11.80% 13.26% 5.87 18,761 1 1 1 61.16
43 112,035 63.52% 67.57% 9.36 11,969 1 1 2 77.84
44 119,324 27.09% 29.64% 8.09 14,757 1 1 1 50.04
45 110,715 16.00% 17.46% 24.23 4,569 1 1 1 33.36
46 121,330 18.99% 22.17% 18.73 6,476 1 1 1 61.16
47 116,674 12.83% 14.16% 40.43 2,886 1 1 1 50.04
48 119,569 3.33% 3.34% 18.56 6,443 1 1 1 38.92
49 117,826 6.26% 6.96% 23.20 5,079 1 1 1 38.92
50 118,281 4.17% 4.23% 43.95 2,691 1 2 1 61.16
51 119,068 2.11% 2.24% 40.35 2,951 1 1 1 50.04
52 113,887 10.45% 11.65% 28.18 4,041 1 2 1 55.60
53 116,496 3.94% 4.07% 31.35 3,716 1 1 1 55.60
54 118,306 2.27% 2.41% 25.03 4,727 1 1 1 55.60
55 114,365 40.31% 43.44% 6.45 17,732 1 1 1 72.28
56 111,650 3.31% 3.42% 12.69 8,796 1 1 1 50.04
APPENDIX C
HOUSE VOTEDATABASE
Year 1996-1 1996-2 1996-3 19964 1996-5 1996-6 1997-1 1997-2 1997-3 19974 1997-5 1997-6 1998-1 1998-2 1998-3 19984 1998-5 1998-6
Bill# SB 446 SB 635 SB 675 HB 265 HB 1193 HB 1283 SB50 SB104SB273 HB 183 HB 543 HB 761 SB 55 SB4I0SB420 HBllOl HB1162HB1529
Westmore- Walker to
Ver¬ Evans Erhart land Irvin Williams West Brown Walker to Culbreth Williams
sion Amend Pass Amend Pass Reconsider Pass Amend Amend Amend Senate Sub Pass Pass Amend Amend Pass Wiles/Erhart Amend Amend
Vote 77-72 141-35 67-99 171-1 31-114 154-8 84-79 78-88 75-95 80-77 91-83 107-49 28-137 64-111 130-44 98-53 103-72 84-91
Dist.# No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
1 Y Y Y Y X Y Y Y Y N N N N Y Y X N Y
2 N Y N Y X Y Y N N X Y X N N Y Y Y N
3 X Y Y Y N Y N Y N N N N N Y Y N N Y
4 Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y
5 Y Y Y Y N X Y Y X N N N N Y N Y N Y
6 Y N Y Y X Y N N Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N
7 Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y N N Y N Y Y Y Y N
8 Y N N Y N Y Y X N N Y Y N N Y Y Y N
9 X Y N Y N X Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y N N Y
10 N Y N Y N Y Y X N X Y Y N N Y X Y N
11 N Y N Y N Y N N X Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N
12 Y Y N Y N Y Y Y N N N Y N N Y Y Y N
13 N Y N Y N Y N N N Y Y Y N N Y Y Y N
14 Y Y Y Y X Y Y Y Y N N N N Y N N N Y
15 Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N N N N Y N N N Y
16 Y Y Y Y N X Y Y N N N N N Y N N N Y
17 Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N N Y N Y N X N Y
18 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
19 Y Y N Y N Y N N N N Y Y N N N Y Y N
20 N Y X Y N Y Y N Y N Y Y N N Y Y Y N
21 X Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N N N N Y Y N N Y
22 N Y N Y N Y X N N Y Y X N N Y X Y N
23 N Y Y Y N Y N X N Y N Y N N Y X Y N
24 N Y N Y Y X Y Y Y N
25 Y Y N Y N Y Y N Y N
26 Y Y N Y N X Y Y Y N
27 Y Y N Y Y Y Y N Y Y
28 Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N
29 Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N Y
30 Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N N
31 Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y X
32 Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y X
33 Y Y Y Y N Y N X N N
34 Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N
35 Y Y Y Y N Y X Y Y N
36 Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N
37 X Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N
38 Y Y Y Y N Y N Y N Y
39 Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N
40 Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y X
41 Y Y Y Y N Y X Y Y N
42 Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y
43 Y Y N Y N Y N X Y N
44 Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N
45 Y Y Y Y X Y Y Y Y N
46 Y Y Y Y N Y N N Y N
47 N Y N Y Y Y N N N Y
48 N N N Y X Y N N N Y
49 N N N Y X Y N N N Y
50 N N N Y X Y N N N Y
51 X N X Y X X X Y N X
52 N N N Y Y Y N N N X
53 N N N Y X Y N N X Y
54 N Y N Y Y N N N N Y
55 N N X X X X X N N Y
56 N Y N Y Y Y N N N Y
57 N N N Y X N N N N Y
58 N N N Y X Y N X X X
59 Y Y Y Y N Y X Y Y N
60 Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N
N N N Y Y N N Y
N Y N Y Y Y N Y
N Y N Y Y N N N
Y Y N N Y Y Y N
N N N Y N N N Y
N Y N N Y Y N Y
N Y N Y N X N Y
N N N Y X X N Y
N N N N Y N N Y
Y Y N N Y Y Y N
N X N Y N N N Y
N N N Y N N N Y
N N N Y N N N Y
N N N Y N N N Y
N Y N N Y Y N Y
N N N Y N N N Y
N N N N Y Y N Y
N N N N N X N Y
N N N N N X N Y
N Y N N Y N N Y
N N N N X N N Y
N N N Y N N N Y
N Y N N Y N N Y
Y Y N N Y Y Y N
Y Y N X Y Y Y N
X Y N N Y Y Y N
Y Y X N Y Y Y N
Y X Y N Y Y Y Y
Y Y X X Y Y N N
Y Y N N N X Y Y
Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y
Y Y X N Y Y Y N
Y Y Y N N Y Y N
Y Y N N N X Y N
Y X N N N X Y Y
N N N Y N N N Y
N N N Y N N N Y
61 N N Y Y Y Y N Y N Y
62 X Y N Y N Y N N N Y
63 Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y N
64 Y N Y Y N Y N N N Y
65 n Y Y Y X Y N N N Y
66 N n N Y y Y N N N Y
67 N y N Y Y Y N N N Y
68 N Y N Y Y Y N Y N Y
69 y n N Y X n N N N Y
70 n y N Y y y N N N X
71 X Y N Y Y Y Y N N Y
72 n Y N Y X Y N N N Y
73 N n y Y y X X N N Y
74 N N y Y n y Y Y Y N
75 Y Y N Y N Y N N N Y
76 Y Y Y Y X Y Y Y X N
77 Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N
78 Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N
79 Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N
80 Y Y N Y N Y N Y Y N
81 Y N Y Y N Y Y Y Y N
82 Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N
83 Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y
84 Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y X
85 Y Y Y X N Y Y N N N
86 Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N
87 Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N
88 N Y N Y Y Y N N N Y
89 N Y N Y Y Y N N N Y
90 X X Y X X Y N Y N N
91 N Y N Y Y Y N N N Y
92 N Y N Y X Y N N N Y
93 N Y N Y X Y X N Y Y
94 N Y N Y N Y Y N N Y
95 X Y N Y N Y Y N Y N
96 N Y N Y N Y N N N Y
97 Y Y Y Y N Y Y N N Y
Y Y Y N N Y Y N
Y Y Y N Y Y Y N
N X N N Y N N Y
Y Y N N N Y Y N
Y X X N Y Y Y N
Y Y Y N Y X Y N
Y Y N N N Y Y N
Y Y N N X X Y X
Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y
Y Y N N Y Y Y N
Y Y Y N Y Y Y N
Y Y N N N Y Y N
Y Y Y Y Y X Y N
X Y N Y Y N N Y
Y X N N Y Y Y N
N Y N Y Y X N X
N N N Y N N N Y
N X N Y Y N N Y
N N N Y N N N Y
N N N N Y N N Y
N N Y Y Y X N Y
N N N Y N N N Y
N X N Y N N N Y
N N N Y X X N Y
N N N Y N X N Y
N N Y Y N N N Y
N N N Y Y N N N
Y Y N N Y Y Y N
Y Y N N Y Y Y N
N Y N N Y Y X Y
Y Y N N Y Y Y N
Y Y N N Y Y Y N
Y Y N N Y Y Y N
Y Y N N N Y Y N
Y X X N Y Y Y N
Y Y N N Y Y Y N
Y Y N N N Y Y N OS
4^
98 Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N
99 Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N
100 N Y N Y N Y N N N X
101 N Y N Y N Y N N N X
102 X Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N
103 Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y X N
104 Y Y X Y N Y Y X Y N
105 Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N
106 Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N
107 Y Y Y Y N X Y Y Y N
108 Y N Y Y N Y N Y Y N
109 X N N Y N Y N Y N N
110 X N N Y N X Y N N X
111 N Y Y Y N Y Y N Y Y
112 X Y Y Y N X Y Y Y N
113 Y Y Y Y X Y Y Y Y N
114 Y Y Y Y X Y Y Y Y X
115 N Y N Y N X N X N Y
116 N Y N Y Y Y N N N N
117 N Y N Y Y Y N N N N
118 X N X Y Y Y N N N N
119 X Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y
120 X Y N Y N X X N Y X
121 Y N X Y N Y N N N X
122 N Y N Y N Y N N N Y
123 X Y N Y X Y N N N Y
124 N N X X Y N X X N Y
125 Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y
126 N Y N Y N Y Y N N N
127 N Y N Y Y N N N N Y
128 X Y N Y N Y Y N Y Y
129 Y N Y Y N Y N Y Y N
130 Y Y Y Y N Y Y X Y X
131 N Y N Y Y Y N N N X
132 Y Y Y Y N Y N Y Y N
133 N N N Y Y Y N N N Y
134 N N X Y Y Y N N N Y
N N N Y Y N N Y
N N N Y N N N Y
Y Y Y N Y Y Y N
Y Y Y N Y Y Y N
N N N Y N N N Y
N Y N Y Y X N Y
N N N Y N N N Y
N N N Y Y N N Y
N N N Y Y N N Y
N N N N Y N N Y
N N N Y Y N N Y
Y Y X N Y Y Y N
N Y N N Y Y Y N
Y Y N N Y Y N N
N N N Y Y Y N Y
N Y N Y Y Y Y Y
N Y N N Y Y N Y
Y Y Y N Y Y Y N
Y Y Y N Y Y X Y
Y Y N N Y Y X N
Y Y N N Y Y Y N
N Y X Y Y N N Y
Y X X N Y Y Y N
N Y N Y Y Y Y N
Y Y N N Y Y X N
Y X N N Y Y Y N
X Y N N Y Y Y N
N X N Y Y N N Y
Y Y N N Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y N Y Y Y N
N X X N Y Y Y N
N Y N N Y X Y Y
N N N Y N N N Y
Y Y Y N Y Y Y N
N Y N N N N N Y
Y Y N N Y Y Y N
Y Y N N Y Y Y N
135 X Y N Y N Y N N N X
136 N N X Y Y Y N N N Y
137 X Y N Y X Y N N N Y
138 N Y N Y N Y X N N Y
139 N Y N Y N Y Y Y N N
140 N Y N Y Y Y Y N N Y
141 X Y N Y N Y Y N N Y
142 X Y X Y N Y N N N Y
143 N Y N Y N Y N N N Y
144 N Y N Y N Y N N N Y
145 N Y N Y N Y N Y Y N
146 Y Y X N N Y Y N Y N
147 N Y N Y N Y N N N Y
148 N N N Y X N N Y N Y
149 Y Y N Y X Y N N N Y
150 N Y N Y N Y Y N N Y
151 N Y N Y X N N N N Y
152 Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N X
153 Y Y Y Y N Y Y X X N
154 Y N N Y N Y Y Y Y N
155 N Y N Y N X N N N Y
156 X Y N Y X Y N N N Y
157 Y Y N Y N Y N N N Y
158 X X N Y X Y N N N Y
159 X Y N Y X X N N N Y
160 N Y N Y X Y X Y N Y
161 N N N Y Y Y N Y N Y
162 N N N Y Y N X N N X
163 X Y N Y N Y Y Y Y N
164 X Y N Y N Y X N N Y
165 X Y N Y N Y Y Y Y N
166 Y Y N Y N Y N N Y Y
167 N Y N Y N Y N N Y N
168 N N N Y Y Y N N N Y
169 X Y N Y X Y Y X N Y
170 Y Y N Y N Y Y Y N N
171 Y Y N Y N Y N N N N
Y Y N N N Y Y N
Y Y N N N Y Y N
Y Y N N Y Y Y N
Y Y X N Y Y Y N
N Y N Y N N N Y
Y Y N N Y Y Y N
Y Y N N Y Y Y N
Y Y N N Y Y Y N
Y Y N N Y Y Y N
Y Y N N Y Y Y N
N N X Y Y N N X
N X N N Y Y Y N
N Y N N Y X Y N
Y Y N N Y Y Y N
Y Y Y N Y Y Y X
Y Y N Y Y N Y Y
Y Y Y N Y Y Y N
Y X Y Y Y N N Y
N X X X N N N Y
N N Y X Y N N Y
N Y N N Y X Y Y
Y Y N N Y Y Y N
Y Y Y N Y X Y N
Y Y N N Y Y Y N
Y Y N N Y Y Y N
Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y N Y X Y Y
Y Y X N Y Y Y Y
N N N Y Y N N N
Y Y N N Y Y Y N
Y N N Y Y N Y Y
Y Y N N Y Y Y N
Y Y Y N Y Y Y N
Y X N N Y Y Y N
Y X N N Y Y Y N
Y X N N Y Y Y N
Y X N N Y Y Y N
OS
OS
172 Y Y N Y N Y Y X Y X
173 N Y N Y Y X Y N N Y
174 X Y X Y N Y N Y Y Y
175 Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N
176 N Y N Y X X Y N X Y
177 N Y Y Y N Y X N N Y
178 N Y N Y N Y N N N Y
179 X Y Y N N Y X N X Y
180 N Y N Y N Y Y Y Y N
N X N Y X X N Y
Y Y N N Y X Y N
N N N Y Y N N Y
N N N Y N N N Y
X Y N N Y Y Y N
N Y N N Y Y Y N
Y Y X N Y Y Y N
N Y N Y Y X N Y




Year 1996-1 1996-2 1996-3 1996-4 1996-5 1996-6 1997-1 1997-2 1997-3 1997-4 1997-5 1997-6 1998-1 1998-2 1998-3 1998-4 1998-5 1998-6
Bill# SB 635 SB 647 SB 678 HB265 HB 1283 HB 1555 SB 41 SB 50 SB 51 SB 254 SB 262 SB 273 SB 420 SB 432 SR 463 HB 1101 HB 1529 HB 1565
Ver¬ Black McGuire Ralston Fort
sion Pass Pass sub Pass Pass Amend Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Fail Pass Amend Amend Pass
Vote 40-8 48-6 10-47 51-1 50-0 32-18 43-9 49-4 43-10 36-16 35-15 48-4 36-17 19-35 40-16 21-32 23-32 34-19
Disl. # No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes No No Yes Yes
I Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y N N X N N Y Y Y
N
2 X Y Y Y Y Y Y Y X Y Y N Y Y N N N Y
3 X Y Y Y Y X Y Y Y Y Y Y Y X Y N N Y
4 X Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N Y
5 Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N Y Y Y
N
6 X Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y
7 N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N
X
8 N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N X Y
9 Y Y N Y Y Y N N Y X N Y N N Y Y Y N
10 Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y X Y N N N Y
11 Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y X Y N N Y
12 Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N N Y
13 Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N Y
14 Y Y N Y Y X Y Y Y Y X Y Y N Y N N Y
13 N Y X Y Y N Y Y Y N Y X Y Y N N N Y
16 Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N N N Y Y N
17 Y Y N X Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N N N Y Y N
18 Y Y N Y Y X Y X Y Y X Y Y N Y N N X
19 Y Y N Y X Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N N
20 Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N Y N N X
21 Y N N Y Y Y Y X Y N Y Y N N Y Y Y N
22 N Y N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y
23 Y Y N Y X Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y N N
24 Y Y N X Y Y Y Y Y Y X Y Y N Y Y Y N
25 N Y N Y X N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N N N Y
26 Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y X Y Y Y N Y Y
27 Y Y Y Y Y Y X N X N
28 Y N N Y Y N N Y Y N
29 Y N N Y Y N Y Y Y N
30 Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N
31 Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
32 X X X Y Y Y X Y X X
33 X Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y X
34 Y N Y Y Y Y N N Y N
35 N Y N X Y X Y Y N Y
36 X Y X Y Y N Y Y N Y
37 Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N
38 Y Y N Y X N X X Y Y
39 X Y N Y Y X Y Y N X
40 Y N N Y Y N X Y N N
41 Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y N
42 Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y Y
43 N Y N Y X N Y Y N Y
44 Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
45 Y X Y Y Y N N Y Y N
46 Y Y N X Y N Y Y Y Y
47 Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
48 X Y N Y Y Y N N Y Y
49 Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
50 Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
51 Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
52 Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
53 N Y Y Y X N Y Y Y Y
54 Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y Y
55 N Y X Y Y Y Y Y N Y
56 Y Y X Y Y X Y Y Y Y
N Y N N Y Y Y N
N Y N N Y Y Y N
Y Y N Y Y N N N
Y Y Y N Y Y Y N
Y Y X N Y N N Y
N Y N N Y N Y Y
Y Y Y Y Y N N Y
N Y N N N Y N N
Y Y Y Y N N N Y
Y Y Y Y Y N N Y
N Y Y N Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y N N N Y
X N X Y N N Y Y
Y Y N N N Y Y N
N Y N N N X Y N
Y Y Y Y Y X N Y
Y X Y Y N N N Y
X Y Y N Y N N Y
N Y N N Y Y Y N
Y Y Y N N N N Y
X Y Y N Y N N Y
N Y N N Y Y Y N
N Y Y N Y Y Y N
Y Y Y Y Y N N Y
N Y Y N Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y N Y N N Y
Y Y Y N Y N N Y
N Y Y N Y X Y Y
Y N Y Y Y N N Y
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